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Birth of a norm champion: how South Africa came to support
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ABSTRACT
In 1995, South Africa was in a special position. It was: a new party to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the
ﬁrst country to voluntarily renounce nuclear weapons, led by a
charismatic leader, and seen as a champion of disarmament
principles. Yet South Africa’s new leaders were also interested in
aﬃrming their position within the Non-Aligned Movement, which
was adamantly opposed to the NPT’s indeﬁnite extension. Why,
then, did South Africa decide to support the indeﬁnite extension
of the NPT in 1995? Existing scholarship has ascribed too much
credit to pressure from the United States, overlooking domestic
debates in South Africa and the bifurcation between professional
diplomats and political elites. This article, building on new archival
sources and in-depth oral-history interviews with major actors,
demonstrates that South African diplomats opposed indeﬁnite
extension while South African policy elites allocated little
attention to the topic until late in the game. The ﬁndings
contribute to our understanding of South Africa’s norm
entrepreneurship, as well as the politics of global nonproliferation.
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In 1995, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) stood at a cross-
roads. Article X.2 states that “Twenty-ﬁve years after the entry into force of the Treaty,
a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indeﬁ-
nitely, or shall be extended for an additional ﬁxed period or periods. This decision shall be
taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.”1 With the treaty entering into force in
1970, this decision was destined to be made at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.
Although it was widely recognized that the NPT provided beneﬁts for all parties, dissatis-
faction with the nuclear-weapon states’ (NWS’) progress toward disarmament, especially
among the countries of the Global South, led many to question whether an indeﬁnite
extension was possible.2 Prominent analysts predicted that, absent major amendments,
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1 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/>.
2 David Fischer, “Reaching a New International Consensus on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: A Perspective
towards and beyond 1995,” in Joachim Krause, ed., Kernwaﬀenverbreitung und internationaler Systemwandel: Neue
Risiken und Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995), pp. 459–76; Tariq Rauf.
“Extending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Beyond the Headlines, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1995), pp. 1–16.
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the treaty would neither garner new members nor be extended indeﬁnitely.3 In the end,
however, these predictions proved wrong.
By the 1995 NPT RevCon, an extraordinary new member had joined the treaty: South
Africa. The country had just dismantled its nuclear-weapon program, transitioned toward
democracy, had the iconic Nelson Mandela at its helm, and was becoming party to all rel-
evant global arms-control agreements. South Africa is widely credited with “bridge build-
ing” at the 1995 conference—as one of the main intellectual drivers behind the two
decisions that helped to attract the support of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and
usher the conference toward a successful conclusion, including the adoption of the
decisions on Principles and Objectives, and a decision on a strengthened review process.4
While the role South Africa played in the conference is widely seen as a major contri-
bution to the budding international status of South Africa,5 scholarly understanding of
how this role came about is not yet complete. Scholars are divided into two camps
when it comes to explaining why South Africa supported the indeﬁnite extension of the
NPT. Some accounts situate the decision to support the indeﬁnite extension in the light
of the changes after the transition to democracy and giving up the nuclear weapons.
This creates an air of inevitability, as if the support for the indeﬁnite extension were a
natural continuation of the foreign policy of the “rainbow nation.”6 Other scholars attri-
bute the success to the pressure levied by the United States, despite ongoing debates in
South Africa (which have been sketched only in broad outlines).7
Support for the indeﬁnite extension was not inevitable nor can it be attributed solely to
US pressure. Although South Africa was on the receiving end of US démarches, so were
seventy other countries. Furthermore, arguments highlighting the role of the United
States tend to overlook that South Africa was a new member of NAM, which had
strong reservations about the NPT and its extension. The African National Congress
(ANC), the ruling party fresh in power in South Africa, had historically
strong relations with numerous NAM countries and enjoyed their support.8 There
was therefore nothing automatic about preferring the US position over the NAM
3 Harald Müller, “Smoothing the Path to 1995: Amending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Enhancing the
Regime,” in John Simpson, ed., Nuclear Non-proliferation: An Agenda for the 1990s (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987), pp. 123–37. This attitude has been criticized in more recent scholarship; see Benoît Pelopidas, “The Oracles
of Proliferation: How Experts Maintain a Biased Historical Reading that Limits Policy Innovation,” Nonproliferation
Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2011), pp. 297–314.
4 Tariq Rauf and Rebecca Johnson, “After the NPT’s Indeﬁnite Extension: The Future of the Global Nonproliferation
Regime,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1995), pp. 28–42.
5 For example: Jean du Preez and Thomas Maettig, “From Pariah to Nuclear Poster Boy,” in William C. Potter and Gaukhar
Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective, Vol. 2 (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 302–35; Zondi Masiza and Chris Landsberg, “Fission for Compliments? South Africa
and the 1995 Extension of Nuclear Non-proliferation,” Policy: Issues and Actors, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1996); Frederick A Van Der
Merwe, “Arms Control and Disarmament in South Africa after the Cold War,” Strategic Review for Southern Africa/ Stra-
tegiese Oorsig vir Suider-Afrika, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2003), pp. 53–87; Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, “Nuclear Diplomacy as Niche Diplo-
macy: South Africa’s Post-apartheid Relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency,” South African Journal of
International Aﬀairs, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2012), pp. 179–200.
6 Walter Carlsnaes and Philip Nel, eds., In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after Apartheid (Midrand: Institute for
Global Dialogue, 2006).
7 Rebecca Davis Gibbons, “American Hegemony and the Politics of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime,” PhD diss,
Georgetown University, 2016; Ian Taylor, “South Africa and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty,” in Donna Lee, Ian
Taylor, and Paul Williams, eds., The New Multilateralism in South African diplomacy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2006), pp. 159–81; Jo-Ansie Karina Van Wyk, South Africa’s Nuclear Diplomacy, 1990–2010: Securing a Niche Role through
Norm Construction and State Identity (Pretoria: University of Pretoria, 2013).
8 Stephen Ellis, External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960–1990 (London: C. Hurst, 2012).
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position.9 Indeed, less than a year before the Extension Conference, the ANC’s main
nuclear “hand,” Abdul Minty, pronounced that “[the NPT] is a discriminatory treaty
where the nuclear weapons states have very little pressure on them to get rid of their
weapons … our eﬀorts must, of course, go to make sure that that does not continue to
operate in such a discriminatory manner.”10
Understanding the genesis of South Africa’s support for the NPT’s indeﬁnite extension
contextualizes South Africa’s post-apartheid norm entrepreneurship as well as the
decision-making process in one of the crucial parties behind the NPT’s indeﬁnite exten-
sion. This apparent discrepancy between the alleged pressure of the United States and the
allegiance to NAM prompted the following historical case study of the policy-making
process and decision to support the NPT’s indeﬁnite extension.11 Although this article
focuses on pragmatic explanation in a single case, some insights may be used to draw
broader implications. The research draws on three sources of material—primarily newly
declassiﬁed archival materials from archives in Pretoria, Berlin, and Washington—as
well as in-depth oral history interviews with the key actors. Whenever possible, we corro-
borate or triangulate these with existing primary sources, mainly earlier declassiﬁed
materials, contemporary newspaper articles, and published memoirs of key participants.
This article shows that one of the main events deﬁning South Africa’s post-apartheid
foreign policy materialized at the last minute. It examines the divergence between the
foreign-policy bureaucracy and the political elites, the latter of whom had paid little atten-
tion to the subject until late in the process. South African diplomats, throughout the prep-
aration process, opposed indeﬁnite extension in favor of a series of conditional extensions.
In a meeting in the Government Guest House near Pretoria on April 1, 1995—with less
than two weeks before the review conference—Vice President Thabo Mbeki changed
this course of action and set South African policy toward indeﬁnite extension.
The Canadian delegation, in the meantime, had been building a coalition, through the
collection of signatures, in favor of indeﬁnite extension, as decided at a meeting among the
Western Group and Russia, chaired by Canadian Ambassador Peggy Mason, in March
1994.12 To pass, the resolution on indeﬁnite extension needed ninety signatures. Two
weeks before the conference’s start, German diplomats estimated 101 countries were
ﬁrmly committed, and twelve additional countries “leaning” toward the indeﬁnite exten-
sion.13 If only 101 were to support the extension, South Africa would be remembered not
as bridge builder, but as the country that stood on the wrong side of history by opposing
the NPT’s indeﬁnite extension. That reputation would have been much more disadvanta-
geous to South Africa than being a bridge builder, and indeed could have hurt the standing
of a newly democratic South Africa emerging from apartheid. In addition, the extension
9 In the end, two countries—South Africa and Benin (persuaded by France)—prevented a NAM position against indeﬁ-
nite extension from emerging. See Thomas Graham, Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Arms Control and Inter-
national Law (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002).
10 Abdul Samad Minty, “Keynote Address,” in The Nuclear Debate: Policy for a Democratic South Africa. Proceedings of a
Conference under the Auspices of the ANC Western Cape Science and Technology Group and The Environmental Monitoring
Group (Cape Town: Environmental Monitoring Group, Western Cape, 1994), pp. 7–15.
11 An explanatory process-tracing study, in the political-science language of Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen,
Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013).
12 Rauf and Johnson, “After the NPT’s Indeﬁnite Extension.”
13 “NVV-Verlängungskonferenz. Positionen der Vertragstaaten. (6 April 1995),” Political Archive of the German Federal
Foreign Oﬃce, Row 675, box 48828 (1995).
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would have happened without the decision on the Principles and Objectives, rendering the
nuclear nonproliferation regime quite diﬀerent from what it is today.
This case study also demonstrates that even a secondary state can, to an important extent,
shape global regimes. We show that the leadership of Vice President Mbeki changed the
direction of South Africa’s position on the 1995 NPT RevCon, thus helping shape the
global nonproliferation regime to a major, hitherto underappreciated, degree.
The second section of this article provides a brief historic overview of South Africa’s
nuclear-weapon program, its rollback, and the country’s reintegration into the nonproli-
feration regime. The third section provides a setting for the formulation of the position by
professional diplomats, both domestically and with relation to other countries. This
section also discusses the so-called “third option,” a privately argued position until two
weeks before the start of the conference, which called for a rolling extension of the
NPT. The third section ends with a discussion of the meeting on April 1, 1995, when
the policy elites and professional diplomats met and completely negated the “third
option.” The fourth section discusses the road of those drafts from the drafting tables
in Pretoria to the meeting rooms in New York. The ﬁfth section concludes.
South Africa’s nuclear-weapon program, its rollback, and integration into
the nonproliferation regime
South Africa is globally recognized for terminating its nuclear-weapon program at the end
of the 1980s. This program started as a civil nuclear-energy program in the 1960s, which
included engineering a unique process for uranium enrichment and exploring peaceful
uses of nuclear explosions (PNEs). By 1974, these interests had evolved into a decision
to detonate one PNE at an underground site in the Kalahari Desert. In 1978, facing inter-
national condemnation and isolation due to its repressive domestic racial segregation
policy of apartheid, and gripped in a war against Soviet- and Cuban-backed forces in
Angola, the apartheid regime in Pretoria took a formal decision to design and develop
a secret strategic nuclear-deterrent capability. Using knowledge and skills acquired
during the 1960s—a period of techno-nationalism and Western collaboration—South
Africa was able to cross this threshold in a relatively short time. Ultimately, driven by
domestic and regional threat perceptions, South Africa produced six nuclear devices,
while remaining staunchly opposed to acceding to the NPT.14 Throughout the 1980s,
research into implosion and thermonuclear technology and longer-range ballistic-
missile delivery systems continued at an ultra-secret nuclear facility known as the
Kentron Circle Facility (also known as Advena). The complex, which was close to Pretoria,
also housed the small nuclear arsenal in special vaults.15
The apartheid regime pursued a nuclear-weapon program to address what it perceived
as the gravest ever threats to its security, both internally and externally. By the early 1980s,
the exiled ANC accelerated attempts to break the apartheid regime’s grip through a new
14 Anna-Mart Van Wyk, “South African Nuclear Development in the 1970s: A Non-proliferation Conundrum?” International
History Review, Vol. 40, No. 5 (2018), pp. 11, 52–73.
15 Hilton Hamann, Days of the Generals: The Untold Story of South Africa’s Apartheid-Era Military Generals (Cape Town:
Zebra, 2001); Bill Keller, “Building (and Dismantling) a Threat,” New York Times, March 28, 1993, <www.nytimes.
com/1993/03/28/weekinreview/march-21-27-building-and-dismantling-a-threat.html>; Magnus Malan, My Life with
the SA Defence Force (Pretoria: Protea Book House, 2006); Frank V. Pabian. “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapon Program:
Lessons for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1995), pp. 1–19.
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strategy involving mass mobilization and an intensiﬁed armed struggle. Concurrently, the
war in Angola intensiﬁed and the number of Cuban forces in Angola increased steadily,
leading to an escalation in South Africa’s military involvement in both Angola and
SouthWest Africa (formerly Namibia).16 By 1985, the apartheid regime was facing a detri-
mental situation that included the ongoing war, increasing internal unrest and continued
incursions by ANC guerrillas, a national state of emergency, the introduction of wide-
ranging sanctions, and UN demands for the immediate independence of South West
Africa. By May 1988, the Angolan war had transformed from primarily a game of cat
and mouse to a more conventional standoﬀ between two small armies with heavy artillery
and modern weapons.17
On December 22, 1988, the agreement between the People’s Republic of Angola, the
Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa (also known as the Tripartite Agree-
ment, or New York Accords)18 granted independence to South West Africa—now
Namibia—and ushered in the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops from
Angola and Namibia. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union, symbolized by
Mikhail Gorbachev’s progressive change of stance toward colonial liberation movements
and the fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of 1989, resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet
support and therefore also, in Pretoria’s view, of a nuclear threat from Southern Africa.
This led to an improvement in the security of South Africa’s borders. This is turn led
to a change in the views of Armscor and the Atomic Energy Agency (AEC, which replaced
the Atomic Energy Board and Uranium Corporation of South Africa in 1982). The AEC
now agreed that South Africa should adhere to the NPT as soon as possible, as there was
“pressure on South Africa to accede now”19 in light of the impending ANC takeover of
government, and also because South Africa would get no quid pro quo for accession.
Armscor in turn indicated that it was no longer committed to a nuclear-weapon
program and would rather focus on a satellite or conventional delivery system.20
President Frederik Willem de Klerk moved fast to put into motion fundamental dom-
estic political reforms aimed at bringing full democracy to South Africa. These included
the relaxation of apartheid laws, talks with the ANC, the unbanning of the liberation
movements, and the release of ANC stalwart Nelson Mandela after twenty-seven years
in jail.21 On February 26, 1990, de Klerk ordered the removal and dismantling of “the
16 Hamann, Days of the Generals; Morgan Norval, Death in the Desert: The Namibian Tragedy (Washington, DC: Selous
Foundation Press, 1989). Waldo Stumpf, former head of the AEC, interview with Anna-Mart Van Wyk, September 2012.
17 “Security Council Widens S. Africa Arms Embargo,” Los Angeles Times, December 14, 1984; The Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act; “Sanctions against South Africa: Current Legislative Issues (14 August 1986),” in Collection: Main Manage-
ment, Foreign Aﬀairs and Organization, Embargo, File 1/17/1, Vol. 5, Armscor Archives (1986); Robert Massie, Loosing
the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years (New York: Nan A. Talese/Doubleday, 1997); United
Nations, “United Nations General Assembly Resolution 39/50 A ‘The Situation in Namibia Resulting from the Illegal
Occupation of the Territory by South Africa’”; United Nations, “United Nations General Assembly Resolution 39/50 B
‘Implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)’.”
18 Agreement among the People’s Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa (Tripartite
Agreement), December 22, 1988, <https://peacemaker.un.org/angola-tripartite-agreement88>.
19 DFA, Memorandum from “De Klerk: South Africa Had the Bomb,” Africa Report, Vol. 38, No. 2 (May–June 1993), pp. 6–7;
David Albright and Mark Hibbs. “South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 49,
No. 3 (1993), pp. 32–37; Herbert Beukes, “Main Points Arising from Luncheon on 14 November 1989 (Memorandum to
Richard Carter),” in File: NPT-IAEA, Agreement/Negotiations on Full-Scope Safeguards, SAFAA (1989); L. Louw, “Waarom
bomme gebou is… en waarom dit nou afgetakel is,” Beeld, March 26, 1998, p. 9; Malan, My Life with the SA
Defence Force.
20 Ibid.
21 BBC News, “Freedom for Nelson Mandela,” On This Day, February 11, 1990, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/
stories/february/11/newsid_2539000/2539947.stm>.
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Controlled Units as well as the Weapons Systems of all existing nuclear weapons, together
with material and material components of incomplete weapons.”22 A steering group con-
sisting of senior managers of the South African Defense Force, AEC, and Armscor would
supervise the dismantling and clean-up process.23 Subsequently, the highly-enriched
uranium production plant was closed; the enriched uranium was downgraded to make
it unsuitable for weapons; the weapons blueprints were destroyed;24 the relevant
Armscor facilities were decontaminated; Armscor’s nuclear facilities were converted for
conventional-weapons work and non-weapon commercial activities; and a full and com-
plete inventory of nuclear materials and facilities was compiled for the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).25
The dismantling of the nuclear-weapon arsenal opened the door for accession to the
NPT, but this would not happen immediately for various reasons, one of which was the
plausible deniability of possessing a nuclear-weapon arsenal. Pretoria also allegedly
wanted to use its voluntary dismantlement as a bargaining chip for resuming “full partici-
pation in the activities of the IAEA, closer collaboration with other African countries in
the development of nuclear technology, unconditional support for the principle of declar-
ing Africa a nuclear weapons-free zone, and participation in global eﬀorts to prevent the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”26 Last but not least, immediate adherence
to the NPT would have placed the IAEA in a unique (and diﬃcult) position of developing
procedures to safeguard nuclear material in an ostensibly non-nuclear-weapon state that
probably possessed nuclear weapons as well as a large inventory of highly enriched
uranium. In other words, should South Africa sign the NPT while still being in possession
of nuclear weapons, the credibility of the NPT would have been seriously damaged.27
On June 28, 1991, Foreign Minister Roelof Frederik “Pik” Botha signaled that South
Africa would sign the NPT after assurances had been received from the IAEA that it
would not be in a position to start inspection of South Africa’s nuclear facilities for at
least two years. The United Kingdom also assured South Africa that, “if it signed the
Treaty, European countries were likely to lift their ban on nuclear cooperation with
South Africa.”28 Botha signed the NPT on July 8, 1991.
De Klerk’s March 1993 revelation of the nuclear-weapon program was followed in July
1993 by a new South African law banning all weapons of mass destruction,29 coinciding
with the conclusion of the IAEA’s veriﬁcation process of the country’s nuclear establish-
ments. This resulted in the recognition of South Africa as a unique case of nuclear rollback,
22 Memorandum, State President to Minister of Defence, “Dismantling of Nuclear Weapons,” February 26, 1990, in N. von
Wielligh and Lydia Von-Wielligh-Steyn, The Bomb: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Programme (Pretoria: Litera,
2015), p. 512.
23 Ibid.
24 BBC News, “Freedom for Nelson Mandela”; Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence
to Disarmament,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 10 (1996), pp. 4–6.
25 Jo-Ansie Van Wyk and Anna-Mart Van Wyk. “From the Nuclear Laager to the Non-proliferation Club: South Africa and
the NPT,” South African Historical Journal, Vol. 67, No. 1 (2015), pp. 32–46.
26 Jeremy Shearar, “Denuclearization in Africa: The South African Dimension,” Disarmament, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1993), pp. 171–
86; Van Wyk and Van Wyk, “From the Nuclear Laager to the Non-Proliferation Club.”
27 “South Africa: Ready to Accede to the NPT (Analysis; 8 February 1990),” in George Bush Presidential Library, Bush Pre-
sidential Records, Staﬀ and Oﬃce Files, National Security Council, Daniel B. Poneman Files, South Africa [OA/ID
CF01350] (1990).
28 K. Nelmapius, “SA sal kernsperverdrag onderskryf,” Beeld, June 28, 1991, p. 1; Van Wyk, South Africa’s Nuclear Diplomacy;
C.S. Wren, “Pretoria Accepts Atom-Arms Ban and Agrees to Plant Inspections,” New York Times, June 28, 1991, p. A1.
29 “Message to Congress on the South Africa–United States Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (2 October
1995),” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 31, No. 39 (1995), pp. 1745–46.
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which bestowed upon the country “signiﬁcant moral and normative power and a unique
nuclear identity as a state that terminated its nuclear weapons program.”30 It also opened
the way for the country to participate as a state party in the review conferences and
preparatory committee meetings of the NPT. Ironically, its ﬁrst participation in an
NPT-related conference was the 1995 RevCon, where the future of the treaty was set to
be decided.31
Preference formation
In the vast majority of countries, the decision to craft a nonproliferation policy is left to
expert bureaucracies.32 The important role of bureaucracies in foreign-policy making is
well established in the foreign-policy literature.33 Stemming from the early work by
Graham Allison,34 the bureaucratic-politics perspective highlights diverging preferences
of actors within diﬀerent government departments, and explains policy outcomes as the
result of their bargaining process. In such processes, actors “promote the positions their
organizations have taken in the past that are consistent with the interests their organiz-
ation represents.”35 In inter-institutional bargaining, therefore, the bureaucrats tend to
have the upper hand due to their undeniable expertise.
But in a transition setting, this may not be the case, as the relationship between the old
bureaucratic elite and the new political elite is not yet settled. South Africa is a perfect
example of this: after the transition to democracy in 1994, the foreign service was still
unsettled—ﬁlled with old, apartheid-era bureaucrats, but with new political masters.36
Though the ANC had recently come into power, its oﬃcials were not yet integrated
into the South African foreign ministry. To further complicate matters, foreign aﬀairs
were assigned to the transitional Sub-Committee on Foreign Aﬀairs (SCAF), which
included members of major parties, and with which senior oﬃcials of the apartheid-era
Department of Foreign Aﬀairs (DFA) engaged to familiarize them with the system.37
This arrangement meant that there was signiﬁcant fraternalization between the senior
oﬃcials and political elites.38
30 Van Wyk, South Africa’s Nuclear Diplomacy, p. 221.
31 Ibid.
32 Only in very few countries, heads of states or high-level oﬃcials become involved in crafting nuclear nonproliferation
policy. The White House’s involvement in the 1995 NPT extension is an exception to this rule; see Graham, Disarmament
Sketches.
33 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, 1971); Graham T. Allison and
Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Longman, 1999); Morton H. Halperin,
Priscilla Clapp, and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
2006); Alex Mintz and Karl De Rouen, Jr., Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, (Cambridge: Cambirdge Uni-
versity Press, 2010).
34 Allison, Essence of Decision.
35 Martha S. Feldman, Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1989). in Steven B. Redd and Alex Mintz, “Policy Perspectives on National Security and Foreign Policy Decision
Making,” Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 41, No. S1 (2013), pp. S11–37.
36 Vineet Thakur, “Foreign Policy and Its People: Transforming the Apartheid Department of Foreign Aﬀairs,” Diplomacy &
Statecraft, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2015), pp. 514–33.
37 SCAF was a part of the Transitional Executive Council, which led the country between October 1993 and the elections in
April 1994, a key period in the transition toward democratic rule in South Africa. See especially Chapter 5 of Matthew
Graham, The Crisis of South African Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Leadership and the Role of the African National Congress
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2015).
38 To the best of our knowledge, SCAF has never dealt with any issues relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Multiple interviewees (including some not named in this paper) have conﬁrmed this to us, and there appear to be no
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One member of the ANC who was formally excluded from that process was Abdul
Minty, an ANC oﬃcial active in the struggle against apartheid, who had opposed the
apartheid regime’s nuclear-weapon program for decades prior to the transition to democ-
racy. At the time, Minty was a senior advisor to Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs Alfred Nzo. He
joined the DFA only after the 1995 NPT RevCon, and was later associated with setting the
tone in South Africa’s nonproliferation policy.39 This circumstance provided for a curious
structure, where political overlords were separated from the bureaucrats who were sup-
posed to supply them with information. It therefore makes sense to present the bureau-
cratic process and the political process separately, because, in reality, they also ran
separate courses until they were merged on April 1, 1995.
Bureaucrats’ preference
South African diplomats started to think early about the position and strategy for the 1995
RevCon, and the cabinet decided as early as 1994 that the country would play an active
role at the conference.40 The conference was, however, the ﬁrst NPT meeting that
South Africa would attend, and one of the ﬁrst multilateral conferences for the country
after it emerged from apartheid. “[W]e were complete babes in the wood. And this was
the ﬁrst major conference for all of us. … [T]o be honest, we didn’t understand how
the conferences worked,” said Peter Goosen, the director for nonproliferation at the
DFA.41 The department had only recently begun to engage in multilateral fora,42 and
the Sub-Directorate of Non-Proliferation Aﬀairs totaled only ﬁve oﬃcials. Despite prior
experience with handling South Africa’s IAEA membership and nuclear disarmament,
the manpower was thin.
Obfuscation abroad
For the South African diplomats, one of the ways in which they could update their
knowledge was participating in meetings organized by the Project of Promoting
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN). The PPNN was a group of senior oﬃcials
(some active and some retired), academics, and experts, who organized a series of
conferences in advance of the 1995 NPT RevCon to bring diplomats from a large
number of countries up to date with matters related to the conference. Headquartered
administratively at the University of Southampton, a former senior UN oﬃcial, Ben
Sanders, acted as the group’s executive chairman, and John Simpson, a Southampton-
based professor, as the program director. One of the meetings took place on July
9–12, 1993, at Chilworth Manor, and one of the thirty-eight diplomats taking part
in the meeting was Peter Goosen, the ﬁrst South African attending a PPNN
references to these themes in the papers of Thomas Wheeler, one of the senior oﬃcials of DFA responsible for liaison
with SCAF.
39 See Abdul Samad Minty, “An Oral History with Abdul Samad Minty / Interviewer: Sue Onslow,” Commonwealth Oral
History Project, <https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/6531/1/abdul_minty_transcript.pdf>.
40 Nic von Wielligh and Lydia von Wielligh-Steyn, The Bomb: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Programme (Pretoria: Litera,
2015).
41 Peter Goosen, An Oral History with Peter Goosen / Interviewer: Michal Onderco (Washington, DC: Nuclear Proliferation
International History Project, 2017).
42 South Africa started joining multilateral fora only after readmission to the UN General Assembly in 1993, although the
multilateral department within DFA had functioned since the mid 1980s. See Thakur, “Foreign Policy and Its People.”
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meeting.43 The participants received three days of workshops focused on procedural
issues, treaty interpretation, security considerations, safeguards and compliance ver-
iﬁcation, peaceful uses, export issues, and regional issues.44 Lectures were given by
either PPNN members (participants in the so-called “Core Group”) or invited
third-party experts. The program was padded with generous breaks for lunches, cock-
tails, and dinners, with the hope that extra time would lead to personal ties being
cemented between diplomats.45
During one of the evenings, Goosen met with Sven Jurchewsky, a Canadian diplomat,
at a pool table. Jurchewsky told Goosen that, for the Canadians, the ultimate goal for the
1995 RevCon was to have an indeﬁnite extension of the NPT, but with signiﬁcant conces-
sions from the NWS.46 Goosen agreed that the NPT should be extended, and that there
should be a mechanism of accountability.47 Jurchewsky continued to share some of the
Canadian thoughts on the subject of accountability in a meeting on the sidelines of the
Third PrepCom meeting in 1994. At the time, these ideas evolved around the adoption
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), export controls, reduction in
the nuclear-weapon arsenals, and the role of tactical weapons—long-term staples of the
nonproliferation agenda.48
Additional information about what the South African government was thinking can
also be gauged by documents from the US Department of State, which was similarly inter-
ested in assessing South Africa’s views and inﬂuencing South Africa’s position early on.
The Bill Clinton administration was strongly in favor of the NPT’s indeﬁnite extension
and put signiﬁcant eﬀort into pursuing a global lobbying campaign toward that goal. In
August 1994, Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., the acting director of the US Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), together with Susan Burk, his deputy at
the time and head of the unit tasked with the NPT’s extension, travelled to South
Africa to advocate for indeﬁnite extension. South African oﬃcials, however, explained
that, at that point, a decision about the country’s position for the RevCon had not yet
been made by the ﬂedgling Government of National Unity. Yet, South African diplomats
told the Americans that they considered the ideal solution was to extend the NPT perpe-
tually, an answer repeated in response to the oﬃcial US démarches in early 1995.49 The
same language of perpetual extension was also used in the ﬁrst meeting of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) in which South Africa participated (March 1995); the South
African diplomats insisted that the word “indeﬁnite” be replaced with “perpetual” in
43 Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, “Issues at the 1995 NPT Conference: An International Seminar for
Government Oﬃcials. List of Participants (9–12 July 1993),” in University of Southampton Special Collections, box MS
424 A3079/1/1/15 (1993).
44 Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, “Issues at the 1995 NPT Conference: An International Seminar for
Government Oﬃcials. General Report (9–12 July 1993),” in Reel 7448, Ford Foundation Grants—U to Z, Rockefeller
Archive Center (1993).
45 Ben Sanders, An Oral History with Ben Sanders / Interviewer: Michal Onderco (Washington, DC: Nuclear Proliferation Inter-
national History Project, 2017).
46 Jurchewsky ﬁrst shared this story immediately after the 1995 NPT RevCon with Darryl Howett, one of the PPNN
aﬃliates. Howett noted it in writing afterwards; see “Darryl’s Meeting with Sven Jurchewsky, 1995,” in University of
Southampton Special Collections, box MS 424 A3079/1/1/19f1 (1993).
47 Sven Jurchewsky, An Oral History with Sven Jurchewsky / Interviewer: Michal Onderco (Washington, DC: Nuclear Prolifer-
ation International History Project, 2017).
48 Tariq Rauf, An Oral History with Tariq Rauf / Interviewer: Michal Onderco (Washington, DC: Nuclear Proliferation Inter-
national History Project, 2017). Canada shared similar ideas around the same time with Mexicans.
49 Graham, Disarmament Sketches; Thomas Graham, An Oral History with Thomas Graham/ Interviewer: Michal Onderco
(Washington, DC: Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, 2017).
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relation to the NPT extension in the NSG’s ﬁnal declaration. What neither Canadian nor
American interlocutors knew, however, was that, for South Africans, indeﬁnite and per-
petual extension did not mean the same thing.50
“The third option”
Though South Africa’s oﬃcial mantra—that it had not yet taken a decision on its position
for the conference—was technically correct, South African diplomats were developing one.
Participation in PrepCom meetings and regular interaction with diplomats from around
the world required South African diplomats to pursue some sort of policy, even without a
blessing from the top. This bureaucratic process led to developing “a private position,”
argued privately, not oﬃcially. This position was to be “deduced” rather than openly
stated and was expressly kept secret so as not to reveal it too early.51 While it was not for-
mally approved by the minister of foreign aﬀairs, South African diplomats acted on the
basis of this private position until two weeks before the conference, and available
documents show they counted on this position when preparing their strategy for
the conference.
At the Fourth PrepCom in Geneva in January 1995, South Africa oﬃcially presented
its legal opinion on the options for extending the treaty.52 The legal opinion identiﬁed
three possible scenarios: an indeﬁnite extension, extension for an additional ﬁxed
period, or extension for additional ﬁxed periods (original emphases). The indeﬁnite
extension meant unlimited duration of the treaty until all state parties withdrew
from the treaty. An extension for a single additional ﬁxed period meant that the
treaty would automatically terminate after the period’s expiry. The analysis of the
third option occupied most of the legal document. South Africa’s legal experts
explained that extension for additional ﬁxed periods would necessitate some sort of
mechanism for the transition from one ﬁxed period to another, to distinguish it
from an indeﬁnite extension. Consistent with the idea of periodic review of the
NPT, South African lawyers argued that a conference toward the end of the review
cycle would be a suitable moment for such review. But would such a mechanism be
negative (i.e., requiring a decision of state parties to prevent roll-over to another
period); or positive (i.e., requiring a decision of state parties to aﬃrmatively extend
the treaty)? The South African lawyers considered the third option with a positive
mechanism to be the one consistent with Article X.2 of the NPT and the 1980
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Given his legal background and position
at the helm of the DFA nonproliferation department, Goosen was part of the team
drafting this legal opinion.53
50 In contemporaneous memoranda, Goosen contrasted perpetual extension “as opposed to” an indeﬁnite one. See Peter
Goosen, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): South African Position and Preparations for the NPT Review and Exten-
sion Conference [February 24, 1995],” in Department of International Relations and Cooperation Archives (Pretoria)
(1995), para, 3.2. However, in his memoirs, Graham clearly states that he viewed perpetual extension as an alternative
to a twenty-ﬁve-year rolling extension. See Graham, Disarmament Sketches, p. 267.
51 Goosen, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” para. 3.2.
52 Oﬃce of the Chief State Law Adviser (International Law) of the Republic of South Africa, “South African Legal Opinion
on Article X.2 of the NPT [27 December 1994],” in Department of International Relations and Cooperation Archives (Pre-
toria) (1994).
53 Goosen, An Oral History with Peter Goosen. Jean duPreez, in his oral-history interview, recalled that the ﬁrst version of
the legal opinion was not contextualized and had to be reworked.
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In a memorandum written after the Fourth PrepCom, Goosen (by then posted to the
Conference for Disarmament in Geneva) explained that “South Africa has to date taken
care not to commit itself publicly to any of the extension options.”54 This was not to let
domestic debate run its course, but to “maintain a ﬂexible position where we could act
as the broker between the NAM and the developed countries.”55 Goosen’s recommen-
dation was to continue pursuing the private option. “This policy [of not oﬃcially
binding toward any of the options] has proven to be successful as is evidenced by the wide-
spread recognition which has been given to the position we have been privately arguing.”56
The memorandum continued to explain that “an extension which has the potential of
drawing support is a rolling extension of successive ﬁxed periods which would extend
the Treaty in perpetuity, but where a positive vote would be required between each of
the succeeding periods to initiate the start of the following period”57—eﬀectively, a pos-
ition equal to the third option from the legal opinion, with a positive mechanism. The
memorandum stated that “it is strongly recommended that South Africa should maintain
its current position until the start [of the conference],” but that such position “should be
deduced, not openly stated.”58
Goosen cited an invitation to a dinner organized by Canada’s permanent representative
to the Conference for Disarmament as a recognition of the privately argued option. A
small group of countries59 “[met] to discuss possible actions which will ensure that the
April NPT Conference has a successful conclusion.”60 “The primary focus of the discus-
sion at the dinner was the South African proposal of a ‘Third Option’ for the extension of
the NPT,” wrote Goosen.61 The German participant in the dinner, Ambassador Wolfgang
Hoﬀmann, recalled South Africa’s “interesting emphasis” on “additional ﬁksed [sic]
periods” as bringing an interesting legal argument to the table, although he did not
suggest South Africans preferred either option.62
Goosen continued to identify the main risk as coming from those advocating for indeﬁ-
nite extension, such as the United States, Russia, and US allies. His vision of South Africa’s
position was to build a bridge away from indeﬁnite extension. In support of the third
option, the memo then suggested that the MFA should lobby the South African Develop-
ment Community (SADC) member countries for support.63 In addition to SADC, the
memo recommended approaching other countries in a similar way, including African
countries on the IAEA’s Board of Governors, as well as Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, Indonesia, Iran, India, and Pakistan. “NO ACTION” (sic) was to be taken in multi-
lateral missions, in order not to reveal the position too soon.64
54 Goosen, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” para. 2.2
55 Ibid., para. 2.5
56 Ibid., para. 2.6
57 Ibid., para. 2.6
58 Both citations from Goosen, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” paras. 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
59 Canada, Australia, Germany, Colombia, Ethiopia, Japan, Argentina, Hungary, Peru, Philippines, the Republic of Korea,
and South Africa; according to the memorandum.
60 Goosen, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” para. 2.8
61 Ibid., para. 2.8
62 Wolfgang Hoﬀmann, “4.prepcom ueberpruefungs- un verlaengungskonferenzenz vom 23.1. bis 27.1.1995: allgemeine
aussprache,” in Political Archive of the German Federal Foreign Oﬃce, Row 675, box 48828 (1995).
63 Although the draft does not mention them, SADC members at that time included Angola, Botswana, Swaziland,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (in addition to South Africa).
64 Goosen, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” para. 3.2
NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 11
Jean duPreez, the nonproliferation desk oﬃcer at the DFA, forwarded Goosen’s memo to
Foreign Minister Nzo almost in its entirety.65 The memo for Minister Nzo clearly spells out
(in bold) that “[i]t is recommended that South Africa’s [sic] should support the rolling exten-
sion of successive ﬁxed periods which would extend the Treaty in perpetuity, but where a
positive vote would be required between each of the succeeding periods to initiate the start
of the following period.”66 This memo also spelled out the strategy for bridge building.
South Africa’s diplomats identiﬁed the debate about the length of the periods as the key
argument against the third option. The solution was to maintain ﬂexibility on the length of
each period. The document expected that the majority of countries would favor ﬁve-year
periods, whereas the United States was not willing to consider anything shorter than a
twenty-ﬁve-year period. The plan was for South Africa to break the deadlock with a pro-
posal for a ﬁfteen-year period.67 To clarify the position, duPreez wrote on March 2, 1995,
that “the Department … recommends that South Africa seek support for an extension
option which is based on a rolling extension of successive ﬁxed periods which would
extend the Treaty.”68 This memorandum warned against a “50%+1” majority vote,
meaning that the decision about the eventual extension should not be taken by the smallest
possible majority. The document also warned against making a decision to which
countries such as Iran, Indonesia, Mexico, or Nigeria would be opposed.
The “privateposition”put forwardby theSouthAfricandiplomats, andadvocateduntilApril
1995, was a fairly radical proposal. It would require a positive vote before each roll-over, which
would be the most demanding requirement of all proposals submitted to the conference. If
South Africa came to the conference with such a position, it was very likely that it would
appeal to the NAM and alienate the Western countries—in particular the United States69—
and Russia, which by then had set the course on indeﬁnite extension.70 While the South
African diplomats had therefore been technically correct to say that their principals had not for-
mulated an oﬃcial policy, they nevertheless acted according to a well-deﬁned strategy.
In the absence of formal guidelines, the oﬃcials acted exactly along the lines of ANC
policy. This is not to say that the ANC dictated the strategy (or was in any way involved
in its crafting, at this point); simply, it was a statement that such strategy and policy were
consistent with what ANC policy would predict. The ANC policy was one of long-held
skepticism of the NPT as a double-standard treaty, and, combined with the rejection of
nuclear weapons, the “private position” made complete sense.71 As Minty later explained
in an interview, the new government’s goal was to reduce the number of nuclear weapons
as well as the number of countries possessing them.72 For an oﬃcial who did not know
65 Jean duPreez, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): South African Position and Preparations for the NPT Review and
Extension Conference [February 27, 1995],” in Department of International Relations and Cooperation Archives (Pre-
toria) (1995).
66 Ibid., para. 2.1.3.
67 Ibid., para. 2.3.4.
68 Jean duPreez, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): South African Position and Preparations for the NPT Review and
Extension Conference [March 2, 1995],” in Department of International Relations and Cooperation Archives (Pretoria)
(1995), para. 6.
69 A similar conclusion was reached by Taylor, though with some confusion on the empirical matter. See Taylor, “South
Africa and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
70 Rauf and Johnson, “After the NPT’s Indeﬁnite Extension: The Future of the Global Nonproliferation Regime.”
71 ANC activist David Goldberg demonstrated this at a national dialogue on nuclear policy in 1993, when he argued for
shorter rather than longer NPT extension. See Van Wyk, South Africa’s Nuclear Diplomacy.
72 Abdul Samad Minty, An Oral History with Abdul Samad Minty / Interviewer: Michal Onderco (Washington, DC: Nuclear
Proliferation International History Project, 2017).
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what exactly a policy principal would prefer, the green-light rolling extension was the best
inference that could have been made. This policy was fully consistent with ANC prefer-
ences and statements before the transition to democracy. At the same time, this policy
was also superﬁcially consistent with the strong preference for nuclear disarmament.
When the support for indeﬁnite extension was unclear (South African diplomats expected
some seventy countries to support such solution, well short of the 50 percent of state
parties), the option hatched by South African diplomats made sense.73
The secrecy and obfuscation allowed South African diplomats to prevent their prefer-
ence from being recognized. Goosen’s preferred language of talking about “perpetual
extension” in his interactions with foreign interlocutors could have confused them, as
even most native English speakers would not see much diﬀerence between indeﬁnite
and perpetual extension. There is no reason to believe Goosen explained to his interlocu-
tors the diﬀerence between indeﬁnite and perpetual extension, as his memorandum
exhorted the need to maintain the strictest secrecy.74
This is especially important when it comes to the cooperation with Canada, discussed
above: Goosen’s interests overlapped with Canadian views when it came to the enhanced
NPT review mechanism. Both Goosen and Jurschewsky supported the idea of a mechan-
ism to hold the NWS accountable. They disagreed, however, over whether the treaty
should be held hostage to it. While Canada (and Jurschewsky) thought that this mechan-
ism should strengthen the treaty once it was extended indeﬁnitely, Goosen’s idea was to
make the treaty’s performance the condition for periodic renewal. South Africa’s insis-
tence on perpetual extension made it possible for Jurchewsky to leave the pool-table
meeting with an understanding that he and Goosen would work together toward an indeﬁ-
nite extension with conditions.75
Political elites’ policy preference
South Africa’s political elites were most likely confronted with the issue of NPT extension
for the ﬁrst time in early 1995, when two letters from the United States, directed at Pre-
sident Nelson Mandela, requested his support for the NPT extension. One was written by
President Bill Clinton and one by General Colin Powell.76 In February 1995, Ambassador
Graham recruited Powell, the recently retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ, to write
to Mandela on the issue.77 Clinton wrote a similar letter to Mandela less than a week later,
on February 13, 1995. It is diﬃcult to establish how inﬂuential these letters were—there
73 South African expectations on this issue were similar to Germany’s. Wolfgang Hoﬀmann, Germany’s ambassador to the
Conference on Disarmament, around the same time predicted that “only about 50–60 states could be thus far ident-
iﬁed, which could be certain to vote for an indeﬁnite extension, additional 25–35 lean towards this option.” See Wolf-
gang Hoﬀmann, “4.sitzung des vorbereitungsausschusses fuer die nvv-konferenz, new york, 23-27.1.1995:
koordinierungstreﬀen der eu und der westlichen gruppe sowie ‘treﬀen in engerem kreis’ am 20.01.1995,” in Political
Archive of the German Federal Foreign Oﬃce, Row 675, box 48828 (1995).
74 Goosen, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
75 Although Germany provides an exception, until very late in the process it had continued to classify South Africa as
opposed to indeﬁnite extension. “NVV-Verlängungskonferenz. Positionen der Vertragstaaten. (6 April 1995).”
76 An additional letter was sent from Vice President Gore to Thabo Mbeki, South Africa’s executive vice president at
the time.
77 Colin Powell, “Letter to Nelson Mandela (8 February 1995),” in Clinton Presidential Library, Folder South Africa 1995 [9]
(1995). Thomas Graham in his memoirs recalled that the South African desk at the State Department identiﬁed Powell
as one of two people in the United States whom Nelson Mandela “might listen to” (the other being Henry Kissinger).
See Graham, Disarmament Sketches.
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was never a formal response to them, and only one of the South African oﬃcials we spoke
to was aware of their existence.78 Vice President Al Gore sent a further letter to Executive
Vice President Thabo Mbeki, whose legal advisor forwarded it to the Ministry of Foreign
Aﬀairs, where it landed on the desk of Jean duPreez. This gave duPreez an opportunity to
convene the policy meeting on April 1.79
The issue reappeared during Mbeki’s travel to Washington to open the US-South-
African Bi-national Commission, February 26 to March 3. To Mbeki—who was well
known for considering good relations with the United States as key for democratic
South Africa—this was an important visit.80 The commission, headed at the vice-presiden-
tial level, aimed to improve bilateral cooperation between the United States and South
Africa. During his visit, Mbeki met with both Clinton and Gore. Clinton pressed Mbeki
on the issue of indeﬁnite extension, explaining the importance the United States
attached to it.81 “Permanent renewal of the NPT is my top foreign policy priority, and I
need your help,” Clinton told Mbeki, according to one of the participants in the
meeting.82 Mbeki and Gore also discussed the issue extensively during their private
dinner and subsequent working meetings. Unfortunately, relevant archival documents
on the South African side could not be found, and an interview with Mbeki could not
be secured; therefore, it is impossible to know what Mbeki’s reaction to the meeting
and the exhortation was. We do know, however, that Mbeki’s vice-presidential oﬃce
paid scant attention to the topic of the NPT’s extension in the run-up to his US visit,83
and he arrived in the United States with a diﬀerent agenda—focused on trade, aid, and
transition assistance, as well as sanctions imposed by the Clinton administration on
South African military giant Denel due to contravention of the 1977 arms embargo
against South Africa.84
According to contemporaneous accounts by senior South African oﬃcials, Mbeki
sympathized with Clinton’s views,85 and it is very likely he understood the signiﬁcance
that the United States attached to the NPT’s indeﬁnite extension. Whatever occurred
between Mbeki and Gore (and Clinton), however, it did not trickle down to the
other branches of the South African government. Foreign Minister Nzo, after attending
a consultation in Cairo on the issue at the end of March 1995, stated that South Africa
saw it “preferable to extend the NPT for a limited period,”86 although he planned to
deliberate with other African countries before conﬁrming a ﬁnal position. Nzo’s prin-
cipal advisor on nuclear issues, Abdul Minty, supported “a straight NAM line” in favor
78 Jean duPreez, An Oral History with Jean duPreez / Interviewer: Michal Onderco (Washington, DC: Nuclear Proliferation
International History Project, 2018).
79 Ibid.
80 Graham, The Crisis of South African Foreign Policy. This view was shared by the highest civil servant in DFA, Director-
General Leo “Rusty” Evans. See Thakur, “Foreign Policy and Its People.”
81 Princeton N. Lyman, Partner to History: The U.S. Role in South Africa’s Transition to Democracy (Washington, DC: US Insti-
tute of Peace Press, 2002).
82 Princeton N. Lyman, An Oral History with Princeton N Lyman / Interviewer: Michal Onderco (Washington, DC: Nuclear
Proliferation International History Project, 2017).
83 DuPreez, An Oral History with Jean duPreez.
84 Lyman, Partner to History. See also Chapter 7 of Martha Van Wyk, “The 1977 United States Arms Embargo against South
Africa: Institution and Implementation to 1997,” PhD diss., University of Pretoria, 2006. The sanctions against Denel
remained in place until 1997.
85 “DFA Director-General Discusses US–SA Relations, Pariah States, DFA Restructuring (2 June 1995),” Department of State
FOIA Virtual Reading Room, <https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/FOIA_Jan2018/F-2016-00610EAN/DOC_
0C06026695/C06026695.pdf>.
86 AFP, “South Africa Wants Limited Extension of Nuke Treaty,” Lexis Nexis, March 29, 1995.
14 M. ONDERCO AND A.-M. VAN WYK
of a ﬁxed-period extension (an even more restrictive option than the one advanced by
the DFA bureaucrats). 87
On April 1, 1995, a little more than two weeks before the review conference, the
political and bureaucratic process merged. This happened at a meeting convened by
Mbeki’s oﬃce, after it had forwarded Gore’s letter to DFA. A small number of high-
level oﬃcials from the MFA, ANC, and the cabinet assembled for a meeting presided
over by MFA Director-General Rusty Evans. The meeting included the presentation of
eight individual options, as well as expected support for them. It is likely that the
oﬃcials from the nonproliferation desk (Goosen ﬂew in from Geneva to attend) pro-
posed the course suggested in earlier memoranda.88 After the presentations, the
meeting took a surprising turn. As Goosen explained, “the most senior of our princi-
pals that was present [Mbeki, according to the list of attendees]… turned around and
said, ‘No, I think this position has to be that we support indeﬁnite extension.’”89 After
a brief discussion, the point was adopted. Mbeki also suggested (and the meeting
approved) that South Africa would propose a set of “principles,” which were meant
to strengthen the treaty review process and address the criticism about the treaty’s per-
formance. Importantly, however, “it was decided that the proposal for a set of ‘Prin-
ciples’ was not a condition for our support for indeﬁnite extension of the Treaty.”90
With this, Mbeki quickly trumped preferences of both bureaucrats and his own
party (Minty).
The task of preparing the list of principles was given to Goosen and duPreez. They
had to come up with the ﬁrst draft within twenty-four hours. As Goosen recollects,
“We went to the oﬃce and we sat there sort of saying, ‘Well, what are we going to
ask for?’”91 It is important to remember that neither Goosen nor duPreez had any
experience from previous review conferences, and therefore had neither practice nor
institutional knowledge to fall back on. At the same time, however, Goosen had experi-
ence from participating in the PPNN meetings and had been informed by Jurchewsky
what the Canadians thought would be appropriate guidelines. By the afternoon of April
2, 1995, Goosen and duPreez had prepared the initial draft of the items for the prin-
ciples, which was then presented to the senior leadership of the DFA, who approved. 92
The meeting on April 1 also established a multipronged lobbying strategy. It was
decided that Mbeki should write a letter to Gore, and pitch to him the idea of the strength-
ened review process, with the goal of eliciting a diplomatic response from the United
States. The strategy also included regional discussions within SADC, the Organization
of African Unity, and NAM. A recommendation was made to appoint Minty as emissary
87 “DFA Director-General Discusses US–SA Relations.”
88 DuPreez, in his oral-history interview, recalled that Abdul Minty suggested a one-time short extension, a position sup-
ported by DFA Director-General Evans’ remarks in a meeting with the US ambassador (fn. 85, 87); Abdul Minty main-
tains that he promoted the idea of indeﬁnite extension. Unfortunately, no written minutes of the meeting are available.
However, Minty accompanied Foreign Minister Nzo to Cairo (as conﬁrmed by both Minty and Nabil Fahmy, one of their
Egyptian interlocutors), after which Nzo proposed the “limited period” extension mentioned above.
89 Goosen, An Oral History with Peter Goosen. This position is also consistent with the account presented (with much less
detail) by another likely attendee, Thomas Markram. See Thomas Markram, A Decade of Disarmament, Transformation
and Progress: An Assessment of the Development and Implementation of Policy on Disarmament, Non-proliferation and
Arms Control in South Africa 1994–2004 (Pretoria: SaferAfrica, 2004).
90 South Africa’s Position on the Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),” April 3, 1995, memorandum of
the April 1, 1995, meeting presided by MFA Director-General Rusty Evans.
91 Goosen, An oral history with Peter Goosen.
92 Ibid.
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to discuss and explain the position in a number of countries. A call was to be made to the
European Union (EU) ambassadors in this regard.93
The memorandum from the meeting does not state the motivation for Mbeki’s
decision, but we may guess it from Goosen’s recollections and the letter Mbeki wrote to
Gore. Goosen was struck by one of the arguments made in the meeting
that human beings have the right, and it’s almost as if it’s a human right, to have their life not
to be threatened by weapons of mass destruction. And as a consequence, South Africa …
would have to adopt the position which would support the elimination of these weapons
and the nonproliferation of these weapons. … The argument that was made was a very
interesting one, it was the ﬁrst time I’d heard that sort of argument being put forward.94
Mbeki made a similar argument in his letter to Gore, writing, “South Africa sees its non-
proliferation and arms control policy as being integral to its commitment to democracy,
human rights, sustainable development, social justice and environmental protection.”95
Whether it was Mbeki’s real motivation or a post-hoc justiﬁcation, this line placed
South Africa’s position within fundamental rights and values and made freedom from
WMDs part of individual rights.96 This motivation also strikes a difference with the orig-
inal memoranda referred to above and submitted by the DFA diplomats: none of the fun-
damental rights is present in them.
Interestingly, Mbeki’s letter to Gore and Nzo’s letter to his SADC counterparts97 are
very similar to the statement Nzo ultimately delivered to the conference. The statement
(and the letters) start with acknowledging the critical importance of the treaty. Both docu-
ments continue by reaﬃrming the national commitment to the treaty, underlining that the
concerns about the treaty are not worth weakening it out of fear of future proliferation.
Acknowledging the criticism of the treaty, the letters (and the statement) propose to estab-
lish a list of “Principles for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” as guiding prin-
ciples for future evaluation of the treaty’s performance. Importantly, these “principles”
were not stipulated in the letters. While the letter to Gore invites the United States to
discuss the wording of such principles,98 the letter to SADC does not extend a similar
93 “South Africa’s Position on the Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [April 3, 1994],” in Department of Inter-
national Relations and Cooperation Archives (Pretoria) (1995).
94 Goosen, An Oral History with Peter Goosen. Two other diplomats, of which at least one was present in the room, remem-
bered a similar argument in their memoirs. See Markram, A Decade of Disarmament, Transformation and Progress; von
Wielligh and von Wielligh-Steyn, The Bomb.
95 Thabo Mbeki, “Letter to Vice-President Al Gore [April 10, 1995],” in Department of International Relations and
Cooperation Archives (Pretoria) (1995). Interestingly, the notion of democracy is strongly tied to the commitment
also in Nzo’s speech to the conference, where he draws stark distinction between apartheid and “democratic”
South Africa. See Alfred Nzo, “The Statement by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of South Africa, Mr Alfred
Nzo. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons. 19 April 1995,” in Department of International Relations and Cooperation Archives (Pretoria) (1995).
96 Reader should note that we do not evaluate whether the indeﬁnite extension of the NPT has actually been good for the
goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, of which academics have been critical. We simply note that Mbeki
made this argument explicitly. For an example of the criticism of such linkage, see Benoît Pelopidas. “Nuclear Weapons
Scholarship as a Case of Self-Censorship in Security Studies,” Journal of Global Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4 (2016), pp.
326–36.
97 For example, Alfred Nzo, “Letter to Edward Bwanali, Minister of External Aﬀairs of Malawi [April 13, 1995],” in Depart-
ment of International Relations and Cooperation Archives (Pretoria) (1995).
98 Gore’s response to the letter welcomes such an invitation and Gore recommends that the diplomats of the two
countries discuss them at the conference. See Al Gore, “Letter to Thabo Mbeki [April 13, 1995],” in Department of Inter-
national Relations and Cooperation Archives (Pretoria) (1995).
16 M. ONDERCO AND A.-M. VAN WYK
invitation. The inclusion of a list of principles is the key diﬀerence distinguishing Nzo’s
opening statement from these letters.
The almost verbatim similarity between the letters and speech (with the exception of
the list of principles) gives additional credibility to Goosen’s argument that they had
little experience with multilateral settings. Interestingly enough, the letter to the SADC
ministers was transmitted only on the opening day of the conference, and produced ten
days after the Pretoria meeting, along with the letter to Gore.99 The South Africans had
therefore indeed held their cards close to the chest.
From Pretoria to New York
The 1995 Review and Extension Conference was held in New York starting on April 17,
1995, and NPT members decided to extend the treaty indeﬁnitely in a ﬁnal package
adopted on May 12, 1995. This package contained three decisions: on strengthening the
review process, on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarma-
ment,” and on the treaty extension. In addition, the RevCon adopted a resolution on the
Middle East, which endorsed the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of
mass destruction.100 The negotiations leading to the three decisions were conducted by a
small group of the most important countries at the conference—the so-called Friends of
the President—convened by Conference President Jayantha Dhanapala. The resolution
on the Middle East was negotiated separately by the United States and Egypt, with only
very limited inﬂuence and input from other countries.
Between the meeting on April 1 and tabling the document to the Friends of the Presi-
dent, the list of principles experienced some changes. Tracking these changes is, however,
not easy. The document produced on the night of April 1, “Issues to Be Taken into
Account When Considering the Proposal for Principles for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament,” is unfortunately lost from South Africa’s archives. However, given
that Nzo’s speech is almost identical to the letters sent before the conference, we have
good reason to think that Nzo’s speech was similar to the document produced on April
1. In fact, a section of Nzo’s speech introducing the principles starts with the words
“We believe that the following broad issues should be taken into account when formulat-
ing the set of Principles for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.”101
Nzo’s speech listed eight issues to be taken into account: restatement of commitment
to nonproliferation, strengthening and adherence to IAEA safeguards agreements,
access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, progress on a Fissile Material Cutoﬀ
Treaty (FMCT), reduction in arsenals, negotiation on the CTBT, commitment to regional
nuclear-weapon-free zones, and provision of negative security assurances.102 As one of the
diplomats who provided feedback on the early drafts remarked, the FMCT and the CTBT
were the main topics of discussion at the time, so it was natural they were in the draft.103
99 Fax (or telex) headers show that the letter to Malawi’s foreign minister, although dated earlier, was transmitted less
than a few hours before the start of the conference.
100 “Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I),
Annex, <https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/
NPT_CONF199501.pdf>.
101 Nzo, “The Statement by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of South Africa.”
102 Ibid.
103 Personal email of Diplomat A to one of the authors, 2017
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These were also the topics that the Canadians had considered to be of most importance.104
The only issue likely not to have been considered by the Canadians was the negative secur-
ity assurances— “this was very much a NAM point—on which … Peter Goosen always
had a very explicit position.”105
After Nzo delivered his speech, Nzo and Gore met on the sidelines, and Gore instructed
the team of US diplomats to work together with the South Africans. “We want you to work
closely together,” Gore said to his diplomats, in a meeting with Nzo and both countries’
delegations.106 In addition, the South Africans were invited by Conference President Dha-
napala to submit a formal proposal of the “Principles.” Before submitting the list to the
Friends of the President, the South African diplomats presented ﬁfteen versions of the
principles to various national delegations. The negotiations in the Friends of President
club is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is important that, in terms of content, the
two documents are very similar to Nzo’s speech. During these negotiations, South Africans
led the eﬀorts and were instrumental in actually creating the bridge that allowed the NPT
to be extended indeﬁnitely by consensus.
Conclusion
This article has aimed to explain why and how South Africa came to support the indeﬁnite
extension of the NPT at the Review and Extension Conference in 1995. Since joining the
NPT in 1991, South Africa has participated in the full review cycle, with a full delegation
since the second preparatory committee in early 1994. South Africa’s support for the
indeﬁnite extension did not result from long-standing traditions. South African diplomats
were predominantly proposing, and planning for, rolling extension, requiring a positive
vote between each of the roll-overs. The goal of such a policy was to hold the ﬁve NPT
NWS accountable on their disarmament progress. While this idea was fully worked out
by the South African diplomats who pursued it vigorously, the course was completely jet-
tisoned two weeks prior to the conference.
We can only speculate what motivated Mbeki to choose this course of action. The avail-
able evidence suggests that he considered both the future relations of his country with the
United States and the normative commitment of the ﬂedgling Government of National
Unity to the fulﬁllment of human rights. Even if the support for the indeﬁnite extension
may have been related (although not solely attributed) to the political pressure from
the United States the decision to propose the set of principles was South Africa’s own.
The case of the NPT extension is also interesting from the point of view of bureaucratic
politics and foreign-policy making in transitioning societies. This case shows that, inter-
estingly, the top policy elites won the intra-institutional battle against the bureaucratic
experts from the Department of Foreign Aﬀairs, despite their policy interest and prior
104 Jurchewsky, An Oral History with Sven Jurchewsky; Rauf, An Oral History with Tariq Rauf. Incidentally, as Thomas Graham
revealed during a critical oral-history conference in Rotterdam, the demand for (and provision of) negative security
assurances was something the US government, already in winter 1994, considered to be one of the possible bargaining
chips in exchange for indeﬁnite extension.
105 Personal email of Diplomat A to one of the authors, 2017.
106 Graham, An Oral History with Thomas Graham. Both Graham and Goosen independently conﬁrmed that the US del-
egation was supportive of the aims of the South African delegation. It is relevant to note that Gore met only two del-
egations in New York during his visit—the South African and the Egyptian ones. See Oﬃce of the Vice President, “Trip of
the Vice President to New York, NY April 19, 1995,” in Vice President’s trip to New York City to attend NPT [Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty] Conference, Box 010, National Archives, Washington, DC (1995).
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knowledge. We might speculate that this was partially made possible by the ongoing tran-
sition, in which old bureaucratic elites needed to demonstrate their allegiance to the new
political order.
The ﬁnal takeaway from this research is that the existence of the Principles and Objec-
tives, or any similar document intended to increase the accountability of the NWS, was not
necessarily tied to the indeﬁnite extension of the treaty. If South Africa did not propose the
document similar to “Principles,” the extension would most likely have occurred after an
acrimonious battle over the voting mechanism and would have left the NPT parties deeply
divided and the treaty weakened. Instead, the NPT’s extension is widely seen to have
strengthened it. Therefore, the role of South Africa in the NPT’s extension should not
be overstated, for it probably would have happened even if South Africa had opposed
it. The shape of the regime, however, would be dramatically diﬀerent, which suggests
that even a secondary power like South Africa can inﬂuence global regimes in important
ways, albeit within certain boundaries.
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